Art. 19(1) of the TEU
Art. 47; art. 48 of the EU Charter

Decision of the CJEU from 6. 10. 2021, W. Ż., C-487/19

The Court first noted that the work schedule may affect the rights of judges guaranteed by the Czech constitutional order, which provides citizens with equal access to public functions and the right to perform these functions undisturbed, and guarantees the independence of judges. The work schedule of judges, which is determined by the president of the court, can potentially limit the rights of judges and their independence (whether externally, i.e. against interference from the public, or internally, i.e. from the president of the court) and thus interfere with these rights. An extreme example would be not assigning any cases to a judge with the intention of preventing him or her from fully performing his or her duties. Similarly, overburdening a judge with the intention of exposing him to disciplinary action or reassigning him or her to another section may compromise their independence and lead to unacceptable coercion.

As the existing case law was to the contrary (i.e. the change in the work schedule cannot affect the rights of judges and as such the change cannot be adjudicated), the Court found that this previous view had been overturned by the ECJ's W.Ż. judgment. Although the ECJ's interpretation only affects judges applying European law, in the case of the Czech Republic, European law can potentially be applied by judges dealing with any agenda. Moreover, although the situation in the Czech Republic is less dramatic than in Poland, the court considers it applicable in the present case. At present the court did not find any conflicting views of the Constitutional Court or the ECtHR.

The court then examined the fulfilment of five cumulative conditions required by Czech procedural law for the hearing of this type of action. The work schedule is addressed to judges (condition 1); it concerns generally defined cases (condition 2); it is a specific act of the president of the court and not a decision or measure of a general nature (condition 3); it directly affects the rights of the judge, as it establishes his or her authority and obligation to exercise decision-making activity in a given area of law (condition 4); and the president of the court in this case acts as an administrative authority (condition 5).

Finally, the court examines the legality. The law does not provide for the transfer of judges between different cases, but this does not mean that the president's power is unlimited. The limit in this case is the arbitrary or capricious nature of the transfer, which must therefore be based on an adequate reason, not discriminatory or motivated by an intention to interfere with the judge's independence. Finally, the Court concludes that the complainant's reassignment was not arbitrary and was based on an appropriate reason, namely the shortage of judges in the administrative section.

Šimon Chvojka & Ondřej Kadlec, University of Masaryk (MUNI)