The Disciplinary Chamber first discussed the general principles. It stated that, on the one hand, a judge cannot be excluded from exercising his constitutional right to freedom of expression, but that, on the other hand, the exercise of such a right by any person, and even more so by a judge, is not unlimited, since it entails duties and responsibilities and may be limited by law. In view of the importance of the separation of powers and the need to ensure the independence of the judiciary, any interference with a judge's freedom of expression must be subject to careful scrutiny. In particular, a judge's speech concerning the functioning of the judiciary is highly protected. Each case must be considered individually, taking into account all the circumstances and the context in which the statements were made. Any sanction for such speech must not have a chilling effect.

A judge is bound by a duty of loyalty and restraint from the moment he assumes office, including in his or her private life. However, the circumstances in which he makes a statement will affect the scope of that duty. A speech in which a judge makes an express reference to his office is to be treated more strictly. Such a speech will also be more closely connected with the way in which the judge performs his duties. If, on the other hand, it is not objectively apparent from the speech that it was made by a judge, this is evidence of greater protection and tolerance. Such speech is less likely to be associated with the office of judge.

The Court's assessment of the judge's statements was divided into two parts - on-camera and off-camera statements.

In the case of the on-camera statements, the court found that they were factual statements. They send a very disturbing signal to the public, as they indicate that the disciplinary defendant, as an experienced criminal judge, believes that the amnesty was prepared for the purpose of allowing certain persons to escape justice by dropping their prosecution, and that it is possible that a bribe was offered to prepare the amnesty in this form. In the opinion of the Disciplinary Chamber, such a communication in itself constitutes a rather fundamental threat to the confidence of citizens in the functioning of the judiciary and the democratic rule of law in general. This does not mean, however, that such a statement by a judge is always absolutely inadmissible. However, on the basis of the evidence presented, the Court concludes in this part that it cannot be said to have a realistic basis. As a result, the judge culpably breached his obligations to refrain, not only in the exercise of his judicial office, but also outside it in the exercise of his political rights, from anything that might undermine the dignity of the judicial office, introduce a cause for diminished confidence in the judiciary or undermine confidence in the independent, impartial and fair decision-making of the courts. The court reprimanded the judge for this.

In assessing the off-the-record statements, the Court pointed to their off-the-record nature and noted that the disclosure of the information was accompanied by a statement that the information was unsupported and that the businessman was not identifiable to the public. Therefore, the judge did not breach any legal duty in this part of the case and there was no disciplinary offence.