The following text summarises the arguments used in the judgment of the ECtHR Chamber. Its findings were later overruled by the judgment of the Grand Chamber (judgment of the ECtHR Grand Chamber of 1 June 2023, Grosam v. the Czech Republic, app. no. 19750/13) on the grounds that the applicant had lodged the complaint late.

The ECtHR Chamber found that the application was founded in part as regards the composition of the Disciplinary Chamber. The ECtHR found that the Disciplinary Chamber hearing cases of law enforcement officers was set up asymmetrically. One-third of the members of the Chamber were professional judges, who worked as full-time judges and were appointed to the Disciplinary Chamber by their respective courts, while two-thirds of the members of the Chamber were "lay assessors", members of specially selected legal professions.
The ECtHR chamber found several problems with the two enforcement officers sitting as lay assessors.
The first issue was the transparency of the procedure by which the lay assessors were appointed, in particular the system for nominating persons to the lists from which the lay assessors were drawn. In this regard, the ECtHR observed that the chair of the disciplinary court keeps several lists of lay assessors. The list of lay assessors who were enforcement officers included ten enforcement officers nominated by the President of the Chamber of Enforcement Officers without any predetermined selection criteria or otherwise transparent procedure (the only requirements being three years' service and good moral character). The President of the Chamber of Enforcement Officers was otherwise given full discretion in his selection.
The second issue was the objective impartiality of the enforcement officers acting as lay judges. It considered it significant that the Minister of Justice has wide powers over the enforcement officers (he or she is at the top of the hierarchy and supervises them, their remuneration is based on a regulation issued by the Ministry) and is entitled to take disciplinary action against any enforcement officer and to become a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The ECtHR concluded this part by stating that since the Minister can take disciplinary action against an enforcement officer, as in the present case, there is a risk that at least two (only the lay assessors of enforcement officers) or even three members of the disciplinary chamber (if a public prosecutor has been drawn by lot to sit in the chamber as a lay assessor) may not be fully impartial towards the enforcement officer whom the Minister of Justice wishes to discipline.
Thirdly, the two lay judges were direct competitors of the applicant, as there is no territorial jurisdiction.

As noted above, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR considered that the applicant's complaint that the disciplinary chamber was not an independent and impartial tribunal, raised in 2015, was submitted more than six months after the end of the disciplinary proceedings against him at the end of 2012, when he was served with the decision of the CC rejecting his constitutional complaint. It therefore did not comply with the six-month rule and was therefore rejected.